The left-wing parliamentary group has published annual figures for stealth SMS and other surveillance measures based on parliamentary questions. The Social Democratic Ministry of the Interior is now putting an end to this.
The Federal Ministry of the Interior has decreed complete secrecy towards parliament regarding telecommunications surveillance measures, thereby taking a new approach. This is evident from the answer to a parliamentary question from the new BSW Group, which enquired about the use of stealth SMS, IMSI catchers, radio cell searches and other digital surveillance methods. These enquiries had previously been regularly made by the left-wing parliamentary group, from which the BSW split off.
The ministry, led by Nancy Faeser (Social Democratic Party of Germany, SPD), writes in the preliminary remarks that the information must be kept secret because it reveals the working methods of the police and customs. If they were made public, this would allow conclusions to be drawn about the “approach, capabilities and methods” of the authorities. In the case of the secret services, the “welfare of the state” would also be jeopardised if “persons in the target spectrum of the measures” were to switch to other communication channels.
Almost all responses are now labelled “classified information – for official use only”. They may not be published by MPs’ offices. In previous years, the Ministry of the Interior had already classified some information as “secret” and deposited it in the Bundestag’s designated classified information room. This concerned, for example, the figures on stealth SMS from the three federal secret services (Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Military Counterintelligence Service and Federal Intelligence Service).
The police and secret services use stealth SMS to ping a telephone without the owners notice and thus create a communication process. With a court order, the radio cells in which the phones were located when the silent text messages were received can be queried from the network operators. This provides the authorities with the location and – if queried several times – a tracking history of the person concerned.
From 2018, the Ministry of the Interior had already categorised the information on stealth SMS for the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. However, the measures taken by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Federal Police were still publicised. The enquiries revealed that the Federal Police, for example, sent well over 100,000 silent text messages by 2016, with this figure levelling off at around 70,000 in the following years. In 2022, the BKA sent around 52,000 silent text messages, a significant decrease compared to 2021.
In the regular questions, the left-wing parliamentary group also enquired about IMSI catchers. These allow the authorities to simulate a strong radio cell into which nearby mobile phones automatically log on. This makes it possible to determine which SIM card a target person or vehicle is using. It is also possible to pinpoint a location to the nearest metre. In 2022, the BKA and other criminal investigation offices of the federal states and customs used the method in 43 cases against 39 individuals; but now, no more public information is provided for 2023.
In the almost fully classified answer, the Ministry of the Interior at least provides a brief response to one question: in 2023, export licences for IMSI catchers were issued to Jordan, Ukraine and Niger, although the latter was “not used” due to the military coup in the summer. The German government does not specify which companies benefited from this due to “trade “business secrecy”.
Published in German in „nd“.
Image: Nowhere to hide: Police and secret services can use stealth SMS to locate telephones or vehicles (Clem Onojeghuo, Unsplash).
